32. Religion, ‘race’ and social justice

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32.1 INTRODUCTION

There are various links between reflections on contemporary religion and considerations of social justice. Most notably, religious doctrines and practices give recommendations on the scope and realisation of social justice (Conclin Frederking 2014), and religious actors often justify their social engagement on theological grounds (Klein et al. 2015; Hjelm 2016). The focus of this chapter, however, is on the ways in which belonging to a religious group, whether actively embraced or ascribed by others, can constitute a salient marker of social inequality. While mainstream liberal academic and public discourses tend to frame manifestations of inequality as an outcome of the ‘disintegration’ of individuals with certain identity characteristics, this chapter suggests that theories of social (in)justice enable a more encompassing lens on inequality as structural and thus endemic to social orders. I will illustrate this point with a focus on Islamophobia as a salient marker of alterity, which affects the daily lives and agency of growing populations across Europe. Drawing on this case, and using empirical examples from different European countries,1 I will discuss the main contours of Nancy Fraser’s understanding of social justice,2 and sketch how her approach offers a multidimensional angle on inequality in ethno-religiously diverse immigration societies.

32.2 THE ‘MUSLIM QUESTION’

Scholarship has pointed to striking similarities (and differences) between antisemitism and Islamophobia (Klug 2014; Meer 2014; Shooman 2014; Kalmar and Ramadan 2016). There are significant historic and contemporary analogies between the classification of Jewish people as a ‘race’ and the racialization of Muslims, and between discursive tropes, generalizations and themes deployed within both repertoires of racism (Klug 2014; Kalmar and Ramadan 2016). These include narratives generalizing depictions of religious collectives as disloyal, backwards, paternalistic, and pre-enlightened or engaged in the construction of a rival civilization that threatens to infiltrate, dominate or even destroy Western democracies. A distinctive feature of contemporary anti-Muslim racism is of course its immigration context, as the settlement of Islamic communities in western

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1 My own work has concentrated comparatively on the cases of Germany and the United Kingdom, hence the focus on these two settings, but I also draw on other scholars’ work to illustrate some wider European trends.

2 It would have been possible to focus on other writers but, as other chapters in this volume demonstrate, Fraser remains a leading thinker and writer in this area and is, in addition, contemporary. For example, Rawls, one of the most cited writers in this volume, wrote his key texts before the growth of multicultural and multi-religious societies as we now know them.
Europe to a large extent is the outcome of labour migration from former colonies (as in the case of the United Kingdom, France or the Netherlands) or in response to targeted recruitment programmes (as in the case of Germany) in the 1950s to 1970s. Thus, in analogy to what was framed as the ‘Jewish question’ in twentieth-century Europe, scholarship has noted the emergence of a ‘Muslim question’ in academic and public debates in the twenty-first century (Meer and Modood 2009; Amir Moazami 2016). This terminology accounts for the prevalent discursive framing of the presence of Islamic populations in Europe, namely a problematization as a ‘question’ that calls for novel regulatory responses.

An array of legal arrangements across Europe thus indeed regulates, for instance, the public visibility of religious practices associated with Islam, including a ban on minarets in Switzerland, prohibitions of full-face veils in the public domain in France, Belgium and Austria, and regional laws that forbid the wearing of explicit religious garments in areas of the public sector in Germany. Many of these regulations stem from racializing conflations between Islam, Islamic fundamentalism and violent Islamist extremism. Differential treatment of Islamic communities can further be traced in key areas of public life such as the education or the criminal justice system in various European settings (Bayraklı and Hafez 2017). Furthermore, minority community representatives are, comparably with representatives of the Christian churches, underrepresented in advisory bodies, political parties, parliament, public administration and the legal system (Lewicki 2014). Finally, systematic analyses of the relationships between religion and economic positionality (conducted in countries that collect representatives in this area) show that Muslims or individuals perceived as Muslim are affected by systematic discrimination: they tend to live in more deprived neighbourhoods, have lower social mobility, receive lower incomes, and are less able to translate higher educational qualifications into equivalent employment (Modood 2005; Khattab 2009; Craig et al. 2013).

Currently prevalent liberal democratic discourses and policies specify this ‘problem’ as a lack of or failed ‘integration’ into European host societies (Lewicki 2014). While mainstream discourses framing approaches to diversity management, such as civic universalism or multiculturalism, differ regarding as to who they consider responsible for addressing the ‘disintegration’ of Muslim populations, and the kinds of regulatory responses they advocate (ibid.), they all suggest that religious minorities need to be transferred from the outside to the inside of a social entity. For civic universalism, for instance, this can be achieved by asserting the secular neutrality of the public sphere (Joppke 2010), whereas multiculturalism advocates equalizing the public visibility and representation of all faith groups in the public realm (Modood 2007). A diagnosis of a ‘being outside’ informs regulatory frameworks that seek ‘to integrate’ by either prohibiting or accommodating religious minority practices, by limiting or extending the freedom of religious expression, or by protecting from discrimination on grounds of markers such as religion, ethnicity or ‘race’. As I trace in greater detail elsewhere (Lewicki 2014), the disintegration diagnosis assumes an understanding of inequality as ‘individual status differential’, thus as lower position in a social hierarchy that is mainly understood as cultural. This understanding falls short of problematizing inequality as multidimensional and as structural, thus rooted within and brought about by various features of the social order.

As an alternative perspective to the reductive ‘integration paradigm’, I propose to draw on a conceptualization of social justice that allows for a more encompassing analysis of structural asymmetries in relation to religion within contemporary European immigra-
Religion, ‘race’ and social justice

This perspective enables us critically to reflect on distinctions that are key features of and thus perpetually reproduced by the systemic logics and dynamics of the current social order, including the capitalist market economy, Christian secularity and the nation-state.

32.3 SOCIAL (IN)JUSTICE

Nancy Fraser’s work, albeit emergent from the US context and thus in some ways responsive to the specificities of social struggles in the United States of America, also provides a helpful perspective on the European situation, as her understanding of social justice allows us to conceive of inequalities specifically as structural, thus emergent from the functionality and underlying logics of the main ordering principles of society.

Overcoming injustice, to Fraser, means deinstitutionalizing and dismantling obstacles that ‘prevent some people from participating on a par with others, as full partners of social interaction’ (2008: 60). The ‘parity of participation’ principle is based on the idea of equal moral worth; it provides a measure for social arrangements, which can be assessed according to whether they permit individuals to participate as peers in key areas of social life (ibid.). In contrast to other prominent conceptualizations aimed at identifying universal principles of justice (e.g. Rawls 1972), Fraser’s understanding of social justice is not substantial, predefined or fixed. In Fraser’s (2012: 43) view, we cannot ever satisfactorily define or fully reach an ideal of social justice; however, we experience injustice, and it is through this experience that we form an idea of justice. Politically, we can make efforts to diminish obstacles to ‘parity of participation’ and thereby approximate social justice. The specific interpretation of parity of participation for any given context, however, needs to be discussed and negotiated, and disagreements about nuances of its meaning are expected to remain. Rather than solving contention about the substance of justice in any given situation, the principle is designed to improve reflexivity within disputes about social change. Thus, the principle is to be applied dialogically and discursively in the exchange of arguments and conflicting judgements (Fraser 2003: 43). It serves to evaluate not only the rules and the processes of political decision-making but also the outcomes, and thus the content of decisions, political initiatives and policies. The legitimacy of political decisions thus depends on the inclusiveness of the process of their emergence and on their qualitative contribution to various dimensions of parity of participation.

To account more explicitly for the multidimensionality and the structural features of injustice, Fraser (2008) proposes an analytical distinction between different types of instituted inequalities, which she categorizes as maldistribution of resources, political misrepresentation or cultural misrecognition. This distinction is not intended to contrast real-world injustices with each other (Young 1997), weigh them up against each other, or to suggest manifestations of them might be specifically economic, genuinely political or ‘merely’ cultural (Butler 1998). Fraser (1998) also does not establish a hierarchy of various manifestations of injustice or deny the multiple intersections between them. Rather, as I read and apply Fraser, she introduces an analytical distinction that assists in unmasking and disentangling a spectrum of systemic roots of injustice, and thereby makes their interrelatedness even more accessible. In this light, Fraser’s parity of participation principle has distinct normative implications for different forms of social relationship.
For instance, within economic social interactions, it enables an assessment of institutional arrangements according to whether they enable equal access to economic resources to all individuals. In relation to cultural norms, parity of participation provides a critical yardstick as to whether customs and values can be defined on equal terms by all members of society. The political dimension of parity of participation requires that everybody who is subjected to a governance structure that shapes the ground rules for their lives, has an opportunity to feed into the deliberation process that precedes decision-making processes, and can hold the decision-makers to account (Fraser 2008).

Thus, rather than distinguishing between members of society who, due to certain characteristics, are perceived to be ‘inside the inner circle’, and those who, due to other features, find themselves ‘outside’ and are to be brought back in, this perspective allows us to think of inequality as a constituent feature of political systems, economic arrangements and cultural orders. Orders and ordering principles, be they capitalist or socialist, liberal or authoritarian, bring about inequality in one form or another. This inequality is sometimes deliberate, sometime incidental, sometimes unavoidable. Distinct political, economic or cultural institutions of course vary in degrees of equality they produce, and the manifestations of inequality differ across contexts. Analyses thus need to pay attention to the ways in which inequality finds expression at any given time in any given order, for instance through social constructions such as class, ‘race’, religion and gender. Thus, rather than dismantling what is often narrated as ‘perceptions’ of women, racialized groups or the working classes by, for instance, enabling them to climb the social or economic ladder, political regulation is to aim gradually at eradicating structural barriers to cultural, economic and political parity of participation.

Attempts to eliminate injustices involve and combine what Fraser calls affirmative and transformative strategies. Affirmative policies, for instance, involve tax-based redistribution and social security, anti-discrimination laws and policies, public education or health-care reforms, thus adjustments within a liberal framework of welfare provision. Transformative strategies, however, aim at altering specific features of cultural, economic and political arrangements that give rise to unjust conditions in the first place. Fraser (2007) prefers the latter over the former, but argues that affirmative measures can be cumulative and thus transformative in the long run.

32.4 STRUCTURAL INEQUALITIES AND SYSTEMIC LOGICS

Applied to the case in question, the racialization of post-migration populations in contemporary Europe, Fraser’s perspective helps us to specify multiple entangled manifestations of structural inequality that are rooted in economic, cultural and political ordering principles. The following section will elaborate on this distinction, pointing to a spectrum of systemic logics that maintain inequality.

First, I shall account in greater detail for what Fraser (2003, 2008) describes as cultural manifestations of inequality. In her view, these can be traced in pervasive patterns of interpretation and evaluation that circulate within public spheres. The attribution of positive or negative meaning to norms or behaviours thereby validates specific values and lifestyles. Certain attitudes, characteristics or practices receive higher appreciation than others, are normalized as the ‘way we do things here’ or elevated to be ethically or morally
superior. While specific cultures can be cultivated within a local community, or an institutional setting, such as a university for instance, they are most commonly framed by the overarching structure of the nation-state, and reproduced through its educational system, national media and regulatory arrangements. The continuous re-creation of culture in the national public sphere draws on interpretations offered by whoever is considered to speak with authority on the subject matter. In contemporary Europe, despite its ongoing decline of religious affiliation and observance, the evaluation of ethical and moral issues or dilemmas continues to be associated with theological expertise and entrusted to representatives of established faith groups, often in dialogue with or addition to more worldly propositions. Political leadership reinforces the narration of ‘national culture’ as rooted within specific religious traditions by speaking of, for instance, Germany’s ‘Judeo-Christian heritage’ (Merkel 2010) or describing the UK as a ‘Christian country’ (Cameron 2011). Public holidays, celebrations and important rites of passage, such as weddings or funerals, tend to be derived from the historically predominant faith’s ritual repertoire, which thereby continues to shape the population’s habitus.

Cultural injustice, in Fraser’s (2003: 36) sense, arises when public narratives or practices systematically depreciate some people or features associated with them. Cultural domination or disrespect, she suggests, can be manifested in failing to acknowledge distinctiveness of experience within these arrangements, but also in burdening people with excessively ascribed difference. For instance, the value system of patriarchy, which tends to be supported by religious teachings of, for instance, Catholicism or Islam, normalizes a heterosexual lifestyle, favours mixed-gender relationships and parenting, and consequently narrates reproduction and cohabitation within the core family as morally superior. Homosexual or transgender lifestyles are constructed as deviation from this norm and continue to be depreciated or even criminalized. Generalizing narratives that describe progressive, egalitarian or secular views as rooted in Christianity, juxtaposing them to accounts of inherently pre-enlightened, illiberal or oppressive Islamic views, similarly attribute moral supremacy to a specific set of norms, practices and lifestyles. In European contexts, such distinctions are often mobilized to justify and maintain the established faith groups’ exclusive privilege to shape public life. The content of educational curricula is one prominent example: studies of German textbooks, for example, have found that teaching materials do not only systematically exclude the perspectives of, for instance, Muslims themselves, they also predominantly contain generalizing negative depictions of Muslims, involving evaluations of Islamic lifestyles with attributes such ‘strange’, ‘premodern’, ‘traditional’ etc., that reinforce perceptions of inferiority and moral otherness (Kröhner-Othman et al. 2011; and Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration 2016). School textbooks, one of the main sites of cultural reproduction, thereby perpetuate hierarchical accounts between native and post-migration community practices as well as a moral distinction regarding faith-based values. Not only do they remain silent about the continuous renegotiation of religious values and practices as well as ongoing processes of bottom-up contention about various interpretations of religious teachings that take place within Christian and of course also Islamic communities (Lewicki and O’Toole 2017), but they also serve to uphold and justify a self-representation of the German public as ‘Christian-Jewish’.

Thus, in summary, at any given time, narratives are upheld within distinct discursive contexts that are not ‘neutral’, but cultivate the appreciation of specific norms, behaviours
and lifestyles, whereby they depreciate others. Often such pervasive patterns of interpretation additionally draw on theological sources, which reinforce a distinction between morally superior and inferior lifestyles. The normative order of society and its pervasive authoritative notions of desirable and undesirable individual or collective practices thereby produce distinct forms of inequality. These inequalities are rooted within the prevalent cultural order of society at any given time, and can only be altered if the underlying value judgements and faith-based justifications are subject to systematic process of renegotiation and reconsideration.

Secondly, Fraser (2003) observes that, although redefinitions of existing norms that underpin the value-based status order, of course, have implications for material and political opportunities, they are unlikely to eradicate inequalities that originate from the logics of the prevailing economic system. In her view, systemic roots of inequality include, for instance, the capitalist modalities of labour division, resource distribution and terms of production. The globalization of markets facilitates the movement of financial capital, goods, and people. The migration of the past century, which accounts for the settlement of, among others, considerably large Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities in the United Kingdom, North African former colonial subjects in France, or Turkish people in Germany, constituted a response to explicit incentives and market demands for cheap labour in the 1960s and 1970s, underpinned in the most part by long-standing colonial relationships. The labour migration of the past century implied that individuals move from poorer to wealthier parts of the world to perform low-skilled tasks in the production or service industry for salaries that are below the average in the country of settlement, but considerably above the average in their country of origin. Their property or ownership of the means of production was thereby usually left behind in the country of origin, and assets or qualifications had much lower economic value in the country of settlement. Economic disadvantage thus disproportionately affects post-migration populations, who, at least in the first generation, and often on a continuing basis, tend to be positioned in the working class (regardless of their former economic status in the country of origin). The positionality as relatively new arrivals contributes to this constellation, in that language skills, social know-how and personal networks, which are built up over the course of generations, assist in accessing education, achieving social mobility and developing careers. Harder to overcome are the effects of systematic discrimination by those who consider themselves more established members of society, thus the persisting projection of a lack of entitlement that negatively impacts on the economic agency of, for instance, collectives marked as religiously distinct. However, the maldistribution and inaccessibility of resources to some population groups, be they marked as religiously, culturally or racially distinct, or the white working classes, will not necessarily be eradicated even if prejudice towards these specific collectives starts to decline. Thus, the eradication of prejudice toward specific lifestyles or markers of alterity does little to address the capitalist market economy’s systematic reliance on private ownership of the means of production, its concentration of assets and resources, the value of property, and the economic benefits of low wages. Crucial here is that mechanisms of redistribution, such as those associated with liberal market societies and their respective welfare systems, are predominantly deployed within the framework of the nation-state, thus are framed as expression of solidarity between ‘co-nationals’. The nation-state, thereby, upholds and reproduces a distinction between members of different political and social units, who, qua their membership of
this entity, are endowed with a duty to contribute taxes and entitled to receive welfare benefits. In this light, the capitalist economic system and the predominantly national framing of redistribution constitute structuring principles of the social order that enable, sustain and reinforce specific patterns of inequality. These structural inequalities which have their roots in the economic system manifest themselves as class-, ‘race’-, ethnicity-, religion- or gender-based distinctions, to name just a few. Thus, economic and cultural structural inequalities are intertwined in that, on the one hand, those whose features, practices or lifestyles have been attributed a lower status in the cultural hierarchy are also more likely to be economically disadvantaged; those, on the other hand, who perform tasks that are considered of lower economic value, tend to be stigmatized regarding their habitus and lifestyle. While also finding expression in patterns of cultural value, structural economic inequalities cannot be dismantled through a process of renegotiation of values, but by means of economic restructuring and reorganization as well as through a redistribution of resources.

Thirdly, while access to socio-economic resources is influenced by prevailing cultural hierarchies, and socio-economic position and culturally attributed status have considerable impact on political decision-making capacity, the operating principles of Western liberal democracy themselves too are productive of distinct structural inequalities. Scholars such as David Goldberg (2013), for instance, have argued that the nation-state itself reproduces the logic of ‘racial’ distinction, as it retains the significance of hierarchical categorizations between people and their rights, which are bestowed on them qua membership in the nation. In the light of ongoing process of globalization and heightened mobility, Fraser considers the conditionality of political rights on the criterion of nationality as arbitrary. What is more, the logic of representation requires the right to elect representatives; it requires developing organizational structures to be spoken for; it requires those who mediate between interest groups and decision-makers to make concerns and demands audible; and it further requires invitations by decision-makers to participate in spaces in which decisions are made. In some policy areas, especially those that are regulated internationally, the right politically to represent shifts increasingly from elected parliamentarians to ‘stakeholders’ who are invited to consultations to speak on behalf of their (however-defined) constituencies (for instance, ‘women’, or ‘Muslims’). These various functioning logics of political representation imply that it is easier for those who already have political bargaining power to organize, make themselves audible and be invited to the table.

Across Europe, the scope of political rights made available to new arrivals has differed considerably – while British Commonwealth migrants from countries such as Pakistan or Bangladesh were initially treated as subjects of the Crown and given the right to vote in national parliamentary elections, Turkish and Greek ‘guest workers’ were, until recently, barred from naturalizing and thus voting in Germany. Accordingly, organizations speaking on behalf of those population groups, for instance regarding their religious concerns,

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3 Fraser (2008: 64–5) instead advocates an ‘all-subjected principle’ of democratic representation, on which grounds anyone who is subject to a governance structure that determines the ground rules they are subjected to, also has a right to hold those, who make the decisions, to account. See also Bauböck (2010), whose stakeholder principle multiplies the entitlement to political participation not only horizontally, but also vertically, involving levels of local, national and supranational decision-making as well as different nation-states.
in countries such as the United Kingdom could use their political bargaining power as voters, and were able to build comparably advanced organizational profiles. As a result, representatives of British Muslim organizations were consulted by their government decades before their counterparts in Germany and France. In the twenty-first century, many European governments have developed a more explicit interest in involving Islamic associations in consultations, largely with the aim to improve collaborations on issues in relation to securitization and the prevention of violent extremism (Laurence 2012). Rather than working with organizations created by Muslim communities, governments across Europe carefully selected their interlocutors, and in several instances facilitated the creation of new organizations that were described as distinctly secular (Lewicki 2014). Access to decision-making circles was thus made conditional on the government’s assessment as a secular association (Silvestri 2010), which in several European countries closed the door to established Muslim self-organizations. In this context, secularity is presented as an exceptional and exclusive achievement of Western cultural formations (Sayyid 2014), whereby Christianity is narrated as particularly conducive to its emergence, and Islamic approaches to secularism remain neglected.

Perceptions of Christian political organizations or the established churches’ lobbying departments as ‘culturally prone to secularity’ legitimizes their political claims and campaigns, even if they mobilize in favour of hardly secular agendas, such as extensive exemptions from equality laws (see Lewicki 2014). The attribution of political membership, the endowment of entitlement to politically represent others, and the blurred standards of secular legitimacy constitute ordering principles of liberal representative democracy that determine the political agency of religious minorities and are constitutive of specific political asymmetries. An ongoing multiplication of arenas of deliberation further reinforces such asymmetries, which Fraser (2008) calls the injustice of political misrepresentation.

32.5 CONCLUSIONS

A social justice perspective as outlined above requires scrutiny as to the various roots of distinct manifestations of disadvantage. I applied Nancy Fraser’s conceptual approach to make sense of a spectrum of inequalities that can affect a post-migration subject position. The argument advanced here is that inequality is systematic and structural, thus brought about by the production and circulation of cultural narratives, as well as the underlying logics and dynamics of economic and political systems in Europe. This is not to suggest that other cultural, economic or political ordering principles do not produce inequality, but rather that they are likely to create other forms and manifestations of inequality. The chapter does not intend to suggest that we can distinguish between distinctly economic, political and cultural forms of disadvantage that can be neatly disentangled and traced to

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4 Although there has been continuing criticism, including from young minority ethnic activists, of UK governments that they only consult so-called ‘community leaders’, who tend to be old and male.

5 A post-migration subject position is occupied by individuals who have settled in a region different from their ancestors. I include individuals who, because of their or their parents’ (in some cases great- or grandparents’) migration experience, explicitly identify with specific ethnic or religious self-descriptions, and those who do not wish to be associated with these but are perceived as members of a specific cultural or religious collective.
their separate cultural, economic or political roots, but that contemporary inequality is produced and sustained by the intertwined logics, dynamics and mechanisms of various social orders that structure our lives.

This analytical focus on asymmetries in diverse immigration societies also implies an egalitarian reframing of policies of diversity management. Current discourses and policy approaches to the management and regulation of post-migration ethno-cultural diversity tend to be driven by the reductive logic of ‘(dis)integration’. Governments, such as those in France, Germany and the United Kingdom have, for the past decade, either assumed that immigrant communities need to be activated to volunteer and contribute to the common good (for a detailed critical elaboration of the focus on social cohesion, see Dobbernack 2014; Lewicki 2014), or expect them to publicly assert their commitment to the values of the constitutional order, pass citizenship and language tests, etc. (for a critique of the civic turn in immigration policy see Mouritsen 2006; Peter 2008; Lewicki 2014, 2017; Lewis and Craig 2014). While language lessons and volunteering may certainly be helpful activities, they reflect a preference for political interventions that target and seek to readjust post-migration populations’ cognitive-affective predispositions and value orientations as opposed to challenging more deeply seated and systematic cultural, economic and political status hierarchies within contemporary immigration societies. The logic of integration fails to render cultural depreciation and racialization socially unacceptable, it hardly contests the conditioning of political rights via identity characteristics such as nationality, and it does little to challenge political incentives or market demands for a continuing import of ‘cheap labour’ from other countries.

European governments that in recent years highlighted a pronounced material and political commitment to integration policies also actively incentivized new immigration to address shortages in certain sectors of the labour market, and tightened naturalization laws. The logic of current integration policies thus rests on a sense of entitlement that the dirty work should be done for little reward by the unsettled poor, who are to remain second class citizens (Anderson 2013). The policy implication of the analytical framework provided here is thus the need for much greater appreciation and explicit consideration of structural inequalities that impair the agency of marginalized later arrivals to diverse societies. The chapter drew on the example of the currently salient systematic problematization, discrimination and depreciation of populations from Muslim majority countries across Europe.

In summary, if inequalities are structural, and have their roots within the basic mechanisms of our economic, political, cultural (and other) orders, social constructions – such as ‘race’ or class – will persist even if expressions of prejudice directed at specific collectives were to be successfully deconstructed, as other social groups would simply move into their previous position. Attempts to eradicate ‘race’-, religion-, gender- or class-based cultural, socio-economic or political inequalities are thus unlikely to take effect unless they

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6 The Brexit vote in the United Kingdom is likely to lead, at the least, to some powerful policy and political contradictions.
7 On the expansion of the European Union (EU) in 2004, the UK’s New Labour government was one of few in Europe to open the labour market to attract workers from eastern Europe to fill gaps in key areas. The German Christian Democratic and Social Democratic Coalition was the only EU government that committed to accepting considerably higher numbers of refugees from Syria in 2015, and immediately channelled resources into recruitment programmes that were to close labour shortages in the care of older people.
Handbook on global social justice

involve more encompassing processes of restructuring of some of the ordering principles of society. Fraser's principle of parity of participation can provide a critical yardstick to frame such debates and negotiations.

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