Citizenship beyond Multiculturalism? The Requirements of Social Justice in Diverse Societies

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Citizenship beyond Multiculturalism? The Requirements of Social Justice in Diverse Societies

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ABSTRACT *This article proposes a normative perspective that reintroduces social justice considerations more explicitly into debates about the integrative function of democratic citizenship in Europe. Such conceptual adjustments are, I suggest, not achieved by defending multiculturalism or abandoning its key concerns altogether, but by building on the significant contribution the concept has made to our understanding of citizenship while addressing its shortcomings in the light of wider social justice concerns. Key requirements of social justice are (1) the receptiveness to a spectrum of modes of expression and (2) the availability of discursive resources which enable political actors to qualify various experiences of exclusion as unjust, rather than simply as unfortunate. Nancy Fraser's account of social justice offers discursive resources that extend multiculturalism's problematisation of injustice beyond the binaries and boundaries of cultural recognition, while Tariq Modood's agency-centred understanding of citizenship can help to expand public institutions' receptiveness to a variety of modes of expression. Both perspectives are nevertheless not easily combined with each other. An in-depth discussion of their mutual disagreements and tensions thus helps to advance current debates on democracy in diverse societies.*

KEY WORDS: citizenship, social justice, Muslims in Europe, integration, multiculturalism

Multiculturalism has received a great deal of negative publicity recently; in European public debates, the concept has become associated with an inward-looking mode of integration that—at best—facilitates self-segregation and—at worst—culturally based forms of anti-social behaviour and criminality. At the 2011 Munich Security Conference, for example, Angela Merkel and David Cameron reiterated the tenuous but common link between multicultural policies and political terrorism (Euractiv 2011). The implications German and British politicians derive from this diagnosis are that European governments need to limit the 'uncontrolled' flourishing of cultural distinctness and enforce 'Western' values.[1] Most recently, David Cameron spoke of the endurance of the 'indomitable British spirit', and 'the belief in freedom, in democracy, in free speech, in our British values, Western values' in the aftermaths of the Woolwich Murder in London (Back 2013). According to this understanding, political violence constitutes a 'deviant behaviour' that is

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rooted in values that migrant populations have brought from outside to Western Europe, suggesting it was part of a cultural package that multicultural policies allegedly helped to 'cover up'.

Multicultural scholarship has reacted to such critique by showing how these political attacks tended to criticise a caricature of multiculturalism and hardly engaged with the academic and political concepts at the core of multicultural theory and politics (Kymlicka and Banting 2006; Modood 2012; Ozkirimli 2012); anti-multiculturalist rhetoric has also been found to paradoxically accompany a continuing deployment of multicultural policies in some Western countries (Kymlicka and Banting 2006; Meer and Modood 2009, 2012; Modood 2012, 2013).

Efforts to develop new paradigms, furthermore, have taken citizenship beyond multiculturalism. Cosmopolitanism (Linklater 1998; Benhabib 2008; Held 2010), civic liberalism (Joppke 2010), interculturalism (Cantle 2012) and civic republicanism (Putnam 2007; Putnam and Campbell 2010) are prominent variants of such attempts. Yet, as argued elsewhere, multiculturalism's main concern, which is the systematic specification and problematisation of injustices that affect post-migration minorities, is currently missing in civic liberal, republican or cosmopolitan citizenship discourses in Europe (Lewicki 2014).

In a contribution to this journal, Ozkirimli (2012; see also Phillips 2007) has argued that the departure from multiculturalism is premature, as the concept offers an important response to post-migration minorities' experiences of cultural-racist exclusion and stigmatisation. Rather than defending or abandoning multiculturalism altogether, he has proposed an adjusted concept of multiculturalism which encompasses a notion of recognition and adds Fraser's concern with redistribution and participation (Ozkirimli 2012). I share Ozkirimli's view that current political and academic discourses have thrown the baby out with the bath water—social justice considerations have been abandoned all too easily in the current search for improved approaches to integration via democratic citizenship. And while I also agree that Fraser's work raises key issues in this regard, I am not convinced that simply 'adding' economic redistribution and political participation to a multicultural paradigm is satisfying. Rather, I feel that Ozkirimli's proposal has sidelined key tensions that arise from applying Fraser's notion of social justice to our understanding of integration via citizenship—most notably, multiculturalism's focus on the pluralisation of national identity and politics, while Fraser invites us to also interrogate the roots of social injustices within the liberal and capitalist order of society, as well as the contradiction that arises from the multicultural emphasis of the politics of recognition and Fraser's explicit critique of identity politics.

Focusing on Modood's (2005a, 2005b, 2013) notion of liberal multicultural citizenship, which specifies manifestations of *socio-economic*, *political* and *cultural* injustices, and Fraser's (2008) recent work on social justice, which goes beyond the initial dualism between recognition and redistribution, this article discusses the tensions that arise between these two authors' accounts in greater detail.[2] Fraser's work, I suggest, helps to extend the scope of normative objectives of integration beyond recognition within a nationally defined community, while multicultural concerns enable a critical assessment of orientalist tendencies within Fraser's critique of identity politics. As I discuss further below, these two perspectives are nevertheless not straightforwardly combined; a closer examination of their disagreement on (1) the scope of injustices affecting post-migration minorities and (2) modes of claims-making assists me in sketching the requirements of a social-justice-based concept of integration that builds on multiculturalism's strengths

and overcomes its shortcomings. To be more precise, Fraser's social justice considerations, on the one hand, allow us to extend liberal multicultural citizenship's *discursive resources* beyond a concern with the cultural order of society and to formulate a critique of its economic and political order. Modood's focus on sources of political subjectivity, on the other hand, takes us beyond Fraser's structural approach inasmuch as it helps to extend public institutions' receptiveness to a spectrum of *modes of expression*.

First of all, I shall provide brief definitions of the essentially contested concepts that I draw on, most prominently 'integration', 'citizenship' and 'social justice', and explain why I introduce a focus on *discursive resources* and *modes of expression* into the ongoing conceptual debate in this area.

Marshall famously argued that the ability of democratic citizenship to politically and socially integrate a citizenry relies on its responsiveness to claims voiced by marginalised actors. In *Citizenship and Social Class* (Marshall and Bottomore 1992), Marshall described how democratic citizenship developed its integrative capacity through the expansion of civil, political and social rights over the last centuries. He showed that claims for civil rights led to additional claims for political and social ones, which gradually widened the circle of rights holders and the content of their entitlements. The integrative function of citizenship, as it emerges from this perspective, is the *translation of political claims for equality into (sometimes novel) effective and enforceable rights*.[3]

Citizenship theorists have argued that Marshall's approach ignored the limits imposed on the extension of pluralism, inasmuch as the rights he is concerned with have been achieved through the very exclusion or subordination of other rights (Mouffe 1992, 236; Lister 2004). If democratic citizenship is to retain its function as a mechanism that translates equality claims into effective rights, it has to continue expanding the circle of rights holders and extending the content of their entitlements.

The theory of multiculturalism emerged as a response to the failure of communitarian and liberal citizenship to address the growing *cultural* pluralisation of Western societies. Multicultural citizenship attends to the particular forms of exclusion faced by post-migration minorities (which includes individuals who have experienced migration or whose parents have migrated to another country). Modood's (2013) work in particular has problematised injustices such as institutionalised status hierarchies and cultural majority dominance, including disrespect, denigration, exclusion and the invisibility of collective identities in the public realm. Multiculturalism's main concern is that citizenship cannot be negotiated on the cultural majority's terms *only*; it promotes the accommodation of cultural minority practices and of the minority presence in majoritarian public realms. Modood's work has highlighted how collective ethnic or religious mobilisation which advocates such an extension of rights can transform a shared experience of exclusion into empowering and enabling forms of agency.

Fraser's (2005) work on social justice has problematised the recent proliferation of such identity-based social struggles. Fraser is not generally critical of the 'cultural turn', but she is concerned that advocates of identity politics can become so focused on their own debates that they overlook the fact that justice struggles need to be considered in a broader scope. To explicitly account for the multidimensionality of injustice, she proposes an analytical distinction between three types of structural inequalities, namely maldistribution of resources, political misrepresentation and cultural misrecognition (Fraser 2008). Each of these can have distinct meaning for a variety of subject positions, including positionalities related to class, gender, ethnicity, race, disability or sexual orientation, and

others. Fraser's work offers analytical tools to specify a spectrum of inequalities for varying subject positions and traces their roots in the economic, cultural and political order of society.

In Fraser's (2012, 43) view, we cannot define or reach any ideal of social justice; however, we do experience injustice, and it is through this experience that we form an idea of justice. She observes that claimants are more likely to challenge various forms of domination, oppression or exploitation if they have access to discursive resources that allow them to categorise and assess their social position as unjust rather than simply as unfortunate (Fraser 2012, 46). If interpretative schemes or discursive resources that specify various forms of structural injustice are unavailable or discredited, individuals are encouraged to perceive their inferior status as deserved or justified (Fraser 2012, 43). Thus, the absence of claims that problematise injustice does not necessarily mean that there are no barriers to economic, cultural or political participation. It can rather indicate that certain types of claims are not considered legitimate, and thus that political claims are articulated less explicitly and instead more muddled up in the immediacy of acting.

Assuming there is a relationship between perceived legitimacy of normative objectives associated with integration policies and the articulation of political equality claims, I suggest that two key requirements for a translation of equality claims into effective rights are (1) public institutions' receptiveness to the variety of ways in which equality claims might be articulated and (2) the availability of discursive resources that enable claimants to specify and problematise various barriers to parity of participation. To enhance the integrative capacity of citizenship, we thus need to make the social justice implications of a variety of claims accessible and to generate an understanding of integration that helps to identify inequalities as structural and trace their various root causes. Academic frameworks can provide interpretative means that help to disentangle and interpret a variety of modes of expression and offer discursive resources that enable individuals to specify and challenge manifestations of injustice.

This article hence critically examines whether and how multiculturalism provides a specific interpretation of democratic institutions and thereby legitimises or facilitates the articulation of social justice claims and inhibits the expression of others; in a second step, I explore whether and how identity politics constitute a mode of expression that facilitates or inhibits the articulation of equality claims.

The analysis suggests that multiculturalism offers discursive resources on which grounds political actors can comprehensively problematise injustices which affect post-migration minorities, such as their disadvantaged position within the labour or housing market, insufficient political representation or exclusion from the negotiation of public values or collective narratives. However, from a social justice point of view, it also has a number of shortcomings, most notably its limited ability to deconstruct cultural difference and its silence about injustices which have their roots in the global economic or political order. While we can draw on Fraser's work to extend multiculturalism's discursive resources, her take on social justice turns out to be less responsive to sources of political subjectivity that are relevant for the articulation of injustices experienced by post-migration minorities. I conclude by summarising the requirements of an explicitly social-justice-based notion of integration via citizenship in contemporary Europe.

Multicultural Citizenship as a Mode of Integration

Modood shares Taylor's (1992) and Kymlicka's (1995) view that liberal neutrality in Rawls' sense is utopian, as citizenship within a nation-state unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities and disadvantages others. Similar to Young (1990), Modood argues that previously excluded identities should be considered in the public domain, if necessary also by means of group differentiated rights. However, while Young and Kymlicka stop at the boundary of accommodating religious minorities, Modood (2005a, 2005b, 2013) also challenges exclusive tendencies within liberal secularism and explores possibilities of pluralising European models of secularity.

A multicultural understanding of integration stresses the institutional side of democratic politics: 'The need for integration arises, when an established society is faced by some people who are perceived and treated unfavourably from standard members' (Modood 2012, 23). Equality, in Young's sense, requires the impartial and consistent application of norms or conventions and an additional set of rules, norms or conventions that do not (dis)advantage the different parties to whom they are applied (Modood 2013, 49).

Multicultural citizenship engages with forms of institutionalised recognition of group identities, because social identities are *subjectively* important to their holders (Modood 2013, 101). The perspective accentuates an internal subjective self-awareness as opposed to an 'objective' external viewpoint. Modood emphasises the subjectivity and agency that results from national, cultural and religious identifications. In social settings where minority actors are disadvantaged, the heightened salience of their social identification can provide a basis for a public and political collective identity, manifested as politicised form of ethnic pride, on which grounds political claims are articulated. Ethnic identifications can be but are not necessarily grounded in distinctive cultural practices, such as language, religion and dress codes (Modood 2013, 97); Modood describes it as an associational identity which can take the form of pride in one's origin, identification with certain group labels and at times also political assertiveness. In his view, ethnic or religious identity politics can be compared to feminist or gay/lesbian social struggles.

Thus, cultural difference is experienced and expressed in various ways, which can be accommodated if public identities are challenged, dismantled and remade in order to build a new, more inclusive sense of belonging: 'Giving a new public status to an identity group is (...) also to allow them to influence the attitudes, mores and practice of the rest of society' (Modood 2013, 62). In his view, individuals can only develop a sense of belonging to a society if they feel that they have a right to belong (Modood 2012). Multicultural accommodation involves (1) the extension of the circle of participants in the public sphere of laws and institutional representation and (2) the advancement of an inclusive macro-symbolic self-understanding of society as a whole. For instance, this can imply the inclusion of minority representatives into relevant bodies such as public committees, political parties and civil society associations. Public institutions furthermore can be expected to accommodate cultural and religious plurality in school curricula, dress codes, dietary requirements, religious education and worship facilities, ceremonies, the display of religious symbols and public holidays.

Beyond challenging cultural marginalisation and highlighting mechanisms for more inclusive negotiation of social norms, Modood's (2005a, 2005b) work has documented how migration can have an impact on individuals' socio-economic position over several generations. The Fourth Survey on Ethnic Minorities, conducted by Modood and a team of

researchers in the 1990s, was one of the first systematic demonstrations that non-white groups had distinct education, employment and income patterns and trajectories (Modood et al. 1997). The representative data-set indicated that socio-economic positionality strongly varied among different ethnic groups in the UK, offering evidence that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were particularly deprived and disadvantaged in education, employment and housing (Modood 2005a, 2005b). Muslims were found to experience an additional form of cultural racism which comes on top of a post-immigration ethnic penalty—a trend that was confirmed by later research (Modood 2005a, 76; Peach 2006; Khattab 2009) which drew on data obtained from the new question on religion in the 2001 Census. Modood's work linked these racial, ethnic and religious differentials to forms of direct and indirect discrimination; he thereby also provided evidence for the impact of a campaign organised by various Muslim organisations that inspired novel legislation against differential treatment on grounds of religion. In summary, Modood (2013, 36) stresses that multiculturalism is not about cultural or religious rights instead of political equality or economic opportunities, but about additional forms of recognition and representation that may be necessary to empower culturally excluded groups, such as anti-discrimination laws or group-differentiated policies that assist in raising skill levels and labour market access.

By highlighting the fluidity and hybridity of cultural or religious identities, Modood (2013) has defended his perspective against the critique of essentialism. In its positive valorisation of cultural identity, multiculturalism provides a counter-discourse to racist biologism and cultural essentialism; it challenges negative ascriptions by providing a positive perspective on minority identity. Paying particular attention to cultural distinctness as key characteristic of individuals with migration experience, however, multiculturalism inevitably creates or reproduces an element of boundary fixation inasmuch as it pays less explicit attention to alternative sources of political subjectivity, for instance political consciousness around issues such the use of political or economic power. This tendency is inasmuch problematic as the 'War on Terror' has disproportionately heightened the salience of excessive ascriptions and strong prejudice about what it means to be Muslim. Minority representatives across Europe have expressed concern that their religiosity suddenly became a salient category after 9/11 and 7/7 and that they were 'turned into Muslims', whether they were religious or not. In this context, multiculturalism prioritises those individuals' interests who seek institutional representation on the basis of a specific identity, as opposed to those who, for instance, do not want to be seen as Muslim.

The following section now turns to assessing multiculturalism's aspiration to problematise structural injustices as they affect post-migration minorities.

Misrecognition, Maldistribution and Misrepresentation

Fraser's work is concerned with what she calls the grammar and the normative content of social justice claims articulated by current social movements. She has offered a typology of equality claims that helps to specify the explicit or implicit challenge current social struggles pose to institutionalised forms of injustice (Fraser 2003, 2008). She distinguishes between claims for cultural recognition, economic redistribution and political representation,[4] all of which have acquired new weight, scope and content since the Keynesian-Westphalian nation state has ceased to provide the *exclusive* site of decision-making and accountability (Fraser 2008). In other words, Fraser highlights that claims

differ according to their aspirations to transform the cultural, economic or political ground rules which shape social interactions.

This distinction, as has been often misunderstood, is not intended to contrast real world injustices with each other (Young 1997), weigh them up against each other or to suggest manifestations of them might be specifically economic, genuinely political or 'merely' cultural (Butler 1998); she does also not seek to establish a hierarchy of various forms of injustice or deny the multiple intersections between them (Fraser 1998). Rather, as I read Fraser, she introduces an *analytical* distinction that assists in unmasking a spectrum of roots of injustice so their interrelatedness can be addressed through a variety of remedies.

Overcoming injustice, to Fraser (2008, 60), means deinstitutionalising and dismantling obstacles that 'prevent some people from participating on a par with others, as full partners of social interaction.' The 'parity of participation' principle is based on the idea of equal moral worth; it provides a measure for social arrangements, which can be assessed according to whether they permit individuals to participate as peers in key areas of social life (Fraser 2008, 60). In contrast to prominent previous conceptualisations which aimed to identify universal principles (Rawls 1972), Fraser's understanding of social justice is non-substantial. In her view, we can only ever make efforts to diminish obstacles to economic, cultural and political 'parity of participation' and thereby approximate social justice. The specific interpretation of parity of participation for any given context, however, needs to be discussed and negotiated, and disagreements about nuances of its meaning are expected to remain. Rather than solving contention about the substance of justice in any given situation, the principle is designed to improve reflexivity within disputes about social change.[5]

Fraser's parity of participation formulates a more comprehensive egalitarian commitment than Modood's focus on equal respect, impartiality and differentiated rights. The principle has distinct normative implications for different forms of social relationships. For instance, within economic social interactions, it enables an assessment of institutional arrangements according to whether they enable equal access to economic resources to all individuals. Cultural parity of participation is a critical yardstick that measures whether cultural norms are defined on even terms by all members of society. The political dimension of parity of participation requires that everybody who is subjected to a governance structure that shapes the ground rules for their lives has (1) the opportunity to feed into the deliberation process that precedes decision-making processes and (2) to hold the decision-makers accountable (Fraser 2008).[6]

Thus, grounding the integrative function of citizenship on such a 'thicker' egalitarian requirement, we can understand citizenship as mechanism that integrates socially and politically through continuous efforts to eradicate cultural, economic and political barriers to parity of participation.

Among potential ways of eliminating structural injustices, Fraser distinguishes affirmative remedies, such as liberal welfare policies (such as tax-based social security and pension benefits, public education and health care) from transformative alternatives which alter the underlying cultural, economic or political framework that gives rise to unjust conditions in the first place. Affirmative strategies aim for a reform of the existing set of public institutions, while transformative ones challenge the respective public arrangements too. Fraser (2007) prefers the latter to the former, but argues that affirmative measures can be cumulative and thus transformative in the long run.

Applied to post-migration minorities in Europe, Fraser's perspective helps us to specify distinct manifestations of inequality and their respective roots in economic, cultural or political institutional arrangements.

First, economic exploitation can take racially or culturally specific forms of marginalisation and correlates with post-migration minorities' lack of political voice. However, the eradication of race- or ethnicity-based *manifestations* of economic inequalities leaves the underlying structure of economic relations intact and potentially does not target wider structural roots of the problem. Beyond eliminating racialised employment patterns, for instance, the eradication of socio-economic differentials might require a restructuring of the national and global division of labour, the distribution of goods or the modes of production. While attending to culturally specific forms of economic exploitation, multiculturalism hardly problematises larger scale inequalities, which often constitute the driving force of international migration.

Second, racialisation or cultural exclusion, rather than being mere effects of maldistribution, are grounded in pervasive cultural patterns of interpretation and evaluation, which systematically depreciate some people or features associated with them. Cultural injustice can be manifested in failing to acknowledge cultural distinctiveness or in burdening people with excessively ascribed difference (Fraser 2003, 36). While cultural domination, disrespect and non-recognition often have material and political implications, they are unlikely to be eradicated by means of economic restructuring or political reorganisation. Rather, manifestations of structured cultural inequalities require challenges to and redefinitions of existing norms that underpin the current status order. Thus, while multiculturalism attends to cultural marginalisation and exclusion, it offers less challenge to excessive ascriptions as a form of misrecognition.

Finally, while socio-economic deprivation and cultural domination often correlate with differentiated access to political rights, the current dispersion of decision-making power to various levels reflects more than 'just' political exclusion on grounds of culture, nationality or class (Fraser 2008). The decentralisation of democracy and the multiplication of arenas of deliberation reinforce the injustice of political misrepresentation, which is defined as hindered or inadequate translation of social justice claims into effective and binding political decisions. Although the current de-territorialisation and reconfiguration of political space is related to wider processes of economic and cultural globalisation, it cannot be addressed by means of redistribution or recognition but requires adjustments to rules of democratic negotiation and representation. In seeking to pluralise national patterns of representation and advocating inclusion into the narration of national identity, multiculturalism gives limited attention to the ongoing supranationalisation of claims-making processes and institutional responses to them.

From this point of view, multiculturalism accounts for obstacles to parity of participation that result from a subject position as a 'late-comer' to a society that has designed its collective institutions prior to these individuals' arrival. Just as feminist struggles have challenged multiple manifestations of injustices (Fraser 2009), multiculturalism is not silent about issues of economic distribution and political representation. Multiculturalist arguments problematise cultural misrecognition, the racialised division of labour and political patterns of marginalisation and exclusion. However, while multiculturalism does not deny the political and material implications of the migration experience, it explains these with a focus on cultural mechanisms of exclusion, and hardly challenges inequalities which are primarily rooted in patterns

of distribution or the erosion of political representation. Focused on equality of opportunity, it envisages a situation whereby post-migration minorities attain equal footing with the cultural and religious majority within the existing set of national institutions. Focusing on social mobility for resident minorities, multiculturalism also struggles to address inequalities faced by new migrants who fill the resulting gap in the lower segment of the labour market.

A social justice perspective thus requires further scrutiny as to the roots of various manifestations of disadvantage, and it also introduces a more comprehensive egalitarian commitment ('parity of participation') into current conceptual thinking about democratic integration in diverse societies. Thus, while Fraser's work assists us in extending the discursive resources that help us to make sense of the specific inequalities that can affect a post-migration subject-position[7] and thereby requests to address these more comprehensively, I now turn to discussing her concerns regarding a prevalent mode of claims-making, which rest on some problematic assumptions.

Identity Politics as a Mode of Expression

Fraser has raised three objections against identity politics as a mode of expression of equality claims. First, she is concerned that claims for recognition that are cast in identitarian terms are liable to sustain oppressive communitarianism (Fraser 2007, 307). Second, she reasons that identity affirming claims imply a support for specific identities that can inhibit progressive internal contestation within groups (Fraser 2007, 307; also Fraser 1997). Third, she argues that claiming recognition of a particularly defined identity reduces social oppression to the subjective perception of its effects (Fraser 2003, 43); in her view, the wrongness of misrecognition does not depend on the perceived experience. Cultural norms that impede egalitarian social interactions are morally indefensible whether or not they are manifested in the consciousness of the oppressed. Structural patterns of cultural domination and their implications can be identified even if individuals are caught in the prevalent discourse and have internalised the dominant norms to a degree that they do not object to them.

Fraser (2003) thus suggests that misrecognition should be understood as a form of status subordination, an institutionalised pattern of discrimination and value inequality, rather than the denial of recognition for a specific group. She proposes to interpret claims for recognition as struggles over social norms rather than mobilisation in favour of a particular identity. The argument is that it is better to think about how to transform institutions so they can positively influence personal interactions, than trying to define a universal vision of the good life or seeking to transform the individual. While Fraser's conceptualisation of misrecognition is useful inasmuch as it turns the focus on the social justice *implications* of post-migration minority claims, her critique of identity politics rests on three problematic assumptions. As her criticism also reflects common tropes in current academic and public discourses, it is worth revisiting her three concerns in greater detail here. In the following, I shall briefly contextualise Fraser's concept of misrecognition by locating it within feminist debates and then explain my reservations as to her critique of identity politics, taking each of her three points in turn.

Fraser's conceptualisation of misrecognition reflects a resolution that emerged from the 'equality as impartiality' versus 'equality as difference' dispute within struggles against gender oppression (Scott 1997; Young 1997; Phillips 2002; Squires 2003). First wave

feminist struggles, which problematised the exclusion of women from voting and political office, drew on a liberal understanding of equality as impartiality of political institutions. Pointing to gender-based differences, second wave feminist movements demanded that social norms and collective institutions should reflect and address the specific needs of both sexes; impartiality of public institutions did not suffice to overcome traditional patterns that upheld, for instance, the gender pay gap. Positive action drew on an understanding of equality as difference, which was to enable women to gain a positive sense of their common identity as women. This 'cultural' revolution was criticised for its tendency to essentialise gender difference, to reinforce categorisations and ascriptions and lose sight of the capitalist roots of gendered oppression (Fraser 2009). Recent feminist theory has sought to overcome a perspective that paired 'equality' and 'difference' dichotomously by deconstructing the dichotomy itself (Scott 1997; Squires 2003). Thereby the approach is analytically distinct from an equality approach, which would seek to merely 'add women' to the existing scheme; it also varies from a 'difference' based viewpoint which overlooks that 'maleness' and 'femaleness' themselves are socially constructed (Squires 2003, 15). Recent feminist scholarship strives to challenge the multiple ways in which the category 'woman' is constructed in subordination, and seeks to involve both men and women into the negotiation of social change (Scott 1997; Squires 2003; Lister 2004; Budgeon 2014). The implication is that we similarly need to problematise the various ways in which categories such as 'Muslim', 'immigrant' or 'cultural minority' (as well as 'black person' or 'disabled person', etc.) are deployed implying inferiority or used to justify barriers to parity of participation. However, Fraser's objections to identity politics are informed by similarly problematic generalisations about 'cultural norms'.

Fraser's approach seeks to overcome what she calls oppressive communitarianism; she assumes that 'recognition for a particular identity' implies support for communities which are organised around a single substantive idea of a common good and hence advocates a departure from this understanding. Thus, she depicts identity politics as mobilisation on behalf of the preservation of 'substantive' cultural norms. Qualitative research of Muslim minority national and supranational claims-making in Germany and the UK (Lewicki 2014),[8] however, has shown that political activists either reject an ethnic or religious self-description and justify their engagement in terms of seeking to eliminate economic, political and cultural disadvantages, which result from the experience of migration, or additionally reason that they want to preserve aspects of minority identity, for instance by passing their native language or religious rituals on to their children. Individuals adopting the latter strategy are highly reflexive about the distinct meaning cultural norms and habits have for each member of the constituency they represent. Their concern, for instance, is to create and legitimise public spaces in which Islam can be taught and practiced, and to problematise public arrangements if they prohibit the acting out of particular aspects of an identity. Neither representatives of minority organisations, nor their websites or press statements, however, tend to refer to specific cultural norms or religious beliefs; rather, their claims problematise patterns of exclusion from existing state-church arrangements, non-involvement in political consultations or the inability to translate higher qualifications into paid employment. Thus, mainstream Muslim identity politics cannot be seen as centred on a perceived 'cultural specificity', but originates from the perception that the cultural or religious label, rejected or embraced, results in specific economic, cultural and political barriers to parity of participation. Rather than understanding identity politics as

a one-dimensional affirmation of a fixed set of 'cultural' values or affirmation of cultural distinctness, I hence propose conceptualising it as a mode of articulation that problematises a social groups' specific positionality in the existing economic, cultural and political order.

Fraser's second objection, namely that identity politics implied support for a specific identity that inhibits internal contestation, rests on a similarly problematic 'orientalism' and suffers from a secular-rationalist bias. Her principled rejection of identity politics effectively 'universalises' and 'rationalises' articulations at the level of civil society. Forms of expression at an emotive level are devalued because they *might* lack emancipatory potential on another level. Thereby Fraser endorses a Habermasian entry criterion, which seeks to eliminate the articulation of claims which deviate from normalised standards of public reason. Her argument thereby draws on an understanding of secular normativity that, as Amir-Moazami (2011) has shown, is characterised by transformative tendencies towards the individual rather than towards institutions. Thus, Fraser's criterion implies restrictions that are too rigid to realise her standard of parity of participation in processes of democratic deliberation.

As argued by multicultural theory, in-group self-contestation is most likely to be facilitated under plural conditions *in the absence* of the need to defend a social identity against overall negative evaluations (Meer and Modood 2012, 184). Thus, the consequences Fraser draws from her critique of chauvinistic and illiberal practices which are justified with reference to specific ideas that are pertinent within some local or regional contexts carries a negative evaluation of the entirety of social relations unfolding within a particular cultural or religious 'label'. Such a generalising judgement is likely to provoke a defensive reaction against stereotyping and can thereby undermine a constructive dialogue that could potentially facilitate in-group contestation. Whether practices limit parity of participation or violate human rights is best evaluated on a case-by-case basis rather than with reference to an overall assessment of a whole religion or culture, or a 'group' associated with it.

Based on the conceptualisation suggested above, Muslim identity politics problematises existing social norms and institutionalised practices, which, however, find expression through mobilisation in favour of a particular identity. This kind of claim implies a statement along the lines of 'this is who I am and I would freely like to be like this' (as opposed to 'this is who I am and how I want the world to be') which hardly imposes a specific set of norms onto other members of this particular community or wider society. Thus, it is less the particularity of identity politics that we should be concerned with, but a kind of identity politics that would make attempts to impose identity features on other members of society.

I hence suggest assessing collective democratic institutions according to their capacity to limit *practices* that impede parity of participation rather than *expressions* of a particular identity that is associated with a set of norms, for instance a particular religious outlook, which some of its members might use to justify obstacles to the parity of other members. Thereby we understand religion or culture as contested and assume that different individuals offer distinct interpretations of social norms. At the same time, the space of contestation is maintained inasmuch as actual discriminatory practices, including those of majority and minority alike, can be challenged on this basis. The underlying understanding of religion is not one of permanently institutionalised unchangeable metaphysical truth that is reflected in a fixed set of moral rules, but one of a collective regime that offers

individuals access to spirituality and continuously evolving interpretations of ethical standards. While moral values, be they grounded in religious or cultural norms, are subject to change over time, their content shapes individual emotions and perceptions of the social world. As individuals draw on emotional and rational sources to justify their actions, deliberative egalitarian democratic institutions cannot legitimately limit the expression of some views but not others; however, democratic citizens have to accept that collective institutions will limit their ability to act on the basis of their views if their actions imply a violation of other's basic rights or ability to participate as equals.

This takes me to Fraser's third point, namely that social oppression should not be reduced to the subjective perception of its effects; Kompridis (2007) observes that any opposition between what *really* merits the label injustice and what is merely *experienced* as injustice is unsatisfactory. Whereas 'subjective experience is notoriously unreliable as a source of justification, it is also an irreplaceable and absolutely necessary source of intelligibility' (Kompridis 2007, 280). He proposes abandoning a dualism between subjective and objective dimensions of injustice, as the identification of misrecognition— or in fact any of the three injustices—has to pass through *both* subjective experience and subjectless discourses (Kompridis 2007; see also Forst 2007, 291). Thus, social justice claims can be reflected in a spectrum of expressions that includes the mobilisation in favour of a particular identity, as well as eruptions of frustration such as targeted or spontaneous acts of protest or even violence; the latter constitute less clear articulations, but nevertheless air an emotion that contains information about an experience of injustice that can be translated into a critique of collective institutions. Beyond extending the discursive resources that help actors to qualify their experience of exclusion as unjust, we thus need to expand the toolkit that helps to disentangle the information that is implicitly coded in performed claims. Isin's work on 'acts of citizenship' has paved an important path in this direction, and points us to ways of identifying claims that are muddled up in the immediacy of acting, but nevertheless contain important information about social injustices (Isin and Finn 2007; Isin 2009).

Fraser's conceptualisation of misrecognition as institutionalised pattern of status subordination thus has a tendency to objectivism that inhibits her from developing the account of agency that her theoretical focus on claims-making actually implies (Alcoff 2007; Kompridis 2007; McNay 2008). Her critics have hence proposed a materialist understanding of identity politics (Alcoff 2007) or offered linking her account to Bourdieu's notion of habitus (McNay 2008). Inasmuch as these perspectives prioritise a Marxist deconstruction of identity over recognition theory's concern with a positive re-evaluation, they depreciate a key mode for the articulation of claims and prioritise a 'master' concept of injustice. Democratic institutions that seek to enable claimants to move closer to a kind of social justice that is multi-dimensional would have to be responsive to claims that emerge from a spectrum of sources of subjectivity. Further research could perhaps offer analytical tools that help us to further disentangle the social justice implications of various modes of claims-making. Academic analyses could also elaborate in greater detail on the specific meaning three-dimensionally understood injustice has in relation to various other subject positions, including disability (e.g. Danermark and Gellerstedt 2004), sexual orientation, etc.

Conclusions

I shall conclude by briefly summarising the implications of this discussion for our understanding of integration through democratic citizenship. This article focused on the role of citizenship as *translator of political equality claims into enforceable rights*. Following Marshall's prominent argument, I highlighted that citizenship developed its integrative capacity by continuously extending the circle of rights holders and expanding the content of their entitlements.

While an understanding of citizenship as 'translator' combines a liberal definition of citizenship as a *status-granting rights* with a civic republican notion of *civic practice*, the collective identity fostered by this concept can neither be a 'thick' substantial focus on specific values, as a communitarian or multicultural framework would presume, nor should it prioritise the deconstruction of all such identifications, as cosmopolitan citizenship conceptions would propose. Mouffe (1992) offers a helpful argument here— she has been equally critical of liberalism's prioritisation of a 'thin' collective identification with basic rights, as of civic republicanism's focus on a 'thick' collective identity that assumes a culturally or nationally bounded common good; she instead suggests a non-substantial and predefined, but ethico-political type of bond among citizens. In her view, political community can be based on an identification with the principles of *liberty and equality*, which are to be understood in a way that takes into account the different subject positions in which they are relevant, for instance gender, class, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation (Mouffe 1992, 236), and we should add here (somewhat contrary to Mouffe's own account) 'religion'. Fraser's work can be seen as substantiating Mouffe's equality principle further, inasmuch as she asks us to scrutinise public institutions according to their ability to facilitate at least *three-dimensional* parity of participation for each of these subject positions.

I argued that if democratic citizenship is to retain its integrative function, it needs to continue extending the circle of rights holders and expand the content of their entitlements. This integrative function can be facilitated if we attempt to increase (1) the availability of discursive resources that enable claimants to specify and problematise various barriers to parity of participation and (2) to offer interpretations that enhance public institutions' receptiveness to a variety of ways in which equality claims can be articulated.

Focusing particularly on equality claims that result from a post-migration subject position in Western European democracies (specifically in the case of individuals from Muslim majority countries), I discussed how Fraser's work on social justice can help us trace the roots of inequality in the economic, political and normative order of society and thereby extend the discursive resources offered by multicultural citizenship. Challenging orientalist tendencies in Fraser's understanding of identity politics, the second part of this article made a case for a greater receptiveness towards a variety of modes of expression, including identitarian as well as 'implicit' and less conventional articulations of claims. Public institutions are thus encouraged to scrutinise the social justice implications of performed or articulated claims so underlying structural inequalities can be specified and addressed.

The definition of social and political integration that I deduce from this discussion is not the common understanding of an *inclusion into a bounded political community*, but a *process of gradual reduction of economic, cultural and political structural inequalities*. According to this understanding, democratic citizenship's integrative capacity unfolds

through an approximation of social justice. This objective can, in some cases, demand the pluralisation of public institutions and be reached by means of an inclusion of missing perspectives into existing arrangements. Yet, in other cases, it might require changes to the economic, cultural or political order of society.

Notes

[1] Tony Blair's response to Britain's experience with 7/7, namely his 'duty to integrate' speech, is indicative of this discursive logic: Blair highlighted that the suicide bombers had 'received all the advantages' of being brought up in the UK, yet took their own and other peoples' lives in the name of an ideology 'alien to everything this country stands for.' He contrasted the 'particular ideology that arises within one religion at this one time' to essential British values such as 'belief in democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, equal treatment for all, respect for this country and its shared heritage' (Blair 2006).

[2] I draw on Tariq Modood's work as it theorises an understanding of liberal multiculturalism that is prominent within the Western European or the Canadian contexts. While this is also true for Kymlicka's (1995) or Parekh's (2000) perspective, Modood's contribution addresses a current concern inasmuch as it explicitly engages with the accommodation of religious minorities. And whereas Fraser's account resonates with a critique of liberal multiculturalism that has been articulated by scholarly work that coined the term critical multiculturalism (Troyna and Williams 1986; Sivanandan 1990, 2006; May 1999; Kundnani 2002), I chose to focus on her contribution as it is explicitly considers the normative implications for democracy within ethnically and religiously diverse societies.

[3] This understanding of citizenship draws on a synthesis of a liberal concept of citizenship as a status involving rights and a republican notion of citizenship as civic practice—claims-making is fed into the political process and can result in legislation which in turn generates rights. However, this understanding is not territorially bound.

[4] Initially, Fraser (2003) distinguished between claims for redistribution, which problematise socio-economic inequalities, and claims for recognition, which point to cultural status hierarchies. In her more recent work, she adds claims for political representation to this list, which problematise the inadequate translation of claims into political decisions ('misrepresentation') and the absence of opportunities to hold decision-makers accountable ('misframing') (Fraser 2008).

[5] The principle is to be applied dialogically and discursively in the exchange of arguments and conflicting judgements (Fraser 2003, 43). It evaluates the rules and the processes of political decision-making *but also* the content of their outcomes. The legitimacy of decisions thus depends *on the inclusiveness of the process of their emergence* and on their *qualitative contribution to various dimensions of parity of participation*.

[6] Fraser's defence of this 'all-subjected principle' is based on the insight that a territorial- or nationality-based attribution of electoral and political participation rights is just as problematic as the adoption of the all-affected principle, on which grounds universal inclusion could be defended (Fraser 2008, 64–65). See also Bauböck (2010), whose stakeholder principle multiplies the entitlement to political participation not only horizontally, but also vertically, involving the levels of local, national and supranational decision-making as well as different nation-states.

[7] A post-migration subject position is occupied by individuals who have settled in a country different from their ancestors, in which public institutions have not been designed to meet the requirements of their ancestors' cultural customs or religious observance. I include individuals who, as a result of their own or their parents' (in some cases also grandparents') migration experience, explicitly identify with

ethnic or religious 'labels' and those who do not wish to be associated with these, but are *perceived* as members of a particular cultural or religious group.

8 The research was based on a comprehensive analysis of policy documents and 30 qualitative interviews with individuals involved in the making of 'integration' policies, such as political activists, analysts, civil servants and members of minority organisations in both countries (Lewicki 2014).

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